The Communist Party of Great Britain and the ‘Irish Question’, 1949-1968

This is the text of a paper I gave last week at the 22nd Australasian Irish Studies Conference held at Flinders University. It is my first foray into a very contentious issue (see this discussion between Anthony Coughlan and Matt Treacy) so I would be grateful for any feedback, but please be kind!

From the Daily Worker, 11 February, 1933

From the Daily Worker, 11 February, 1933

Since the partition of Ireland at the end of the Anglo-Irish War in 1921, which occurred almost simultaneously with the establishment of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), the Party has generally supported the reunification of Ireland and, since 1969, has supported the call for the removal of Britain’s military and political presence in Northern Ireland. This support for a free and united Ireland originally stemmed from the position of the Communist International in support of the national liberation struggles of all colonial and semi-colonial peoples across the globe, and from the Leninist assumption that revolutions in the colonial sphere would help spark revolutions in the West. Specifically for the British working class, Lenin argued in 1914 that ‘[t]he English working class will never be free until Ireland is freed from the English yoke.’[1]

The CPGB and Ireland in the inter-war period

The CPGB had a substantial Irish membership and had close links to the communist movement in Ireland. Although this was, at times, a strained relationship at times, with the Irish Communists often feeling that their sister party overshadowed them, and in the eyes of Moscow, had to often defer to the leadership of the CPGB. With the Irish Communists going through several different organisations in the inter-war period, the Communist Party of Ireland (CPI) came into being in 1933, ‘Bolshevised’, but still wavering between advocating a broad anti-colonialist front against the British and a more united front against the British and ‘their Irish agents, Cosgrave [and] De Valera’.[2] The CPI and its previous incarnations had attempted to win over left-leaning Republicans from Soar Éire and the IRA (although dual membership had been banned until 1933), but the IRA was deeply divided over left-wing Republicanism as evidenced at its 1934 conference.[3] In response to this, the CPGB, in the journal Labour Monthly, criticised the ‘petty-bourgeois leadership’ of the IRA as ‘unwilling to conduct a fight’ against the De Valera government.[4] However as the 1930s progressed, the British party recognised the IRA as part of a broad anti-fascist Popular Front during the late 1930s, particularly as a number of former IRA men went to fight in the Spanish Civil War.[5]

Compared to its British counterpart, the CPI remained numerically very small during the Popular Front period and during the ‘imperialist war’ phase of the Second World War, resolved to dissolve itself, in line with dominant attitudes towards Irish neutrality in the country at the time. A remnant of the party still existed in the six counties as the Communist Party of Northern Ireland (CPNI), which existed until 1970, while the CPI was reconstituted as the Irish Workers League in the Irish Free State in 1948, becoming the Irish Workers Party in 1962 and finally merging back into the CPI (including the CPNI) in 1970.

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CPGB member C. Desmond Greaves helped to establish the Connolly Association (CA) in 1938, whose aim was to promote Irish Republicanism within the British labour movement. Kevin Morgan, Gidon Cohen and Andrew Flinn have written that the Connolly Association provided ‘a vehicle for socialist republicanism under communist direction, but without any suggestion of rivalry with established communist party structures’.[6] Publishing the monthly newspaper, the Irish Democrat, the CA had a more symbiotic relationship with the republican movement in Ireland and the IRA, rather than King St, which gave lip service to them in the party press, but put much more emphasis on the trade unions. According to the Association’s 1955 constitution, the aims and objects of the CA were:

To organise Irish men and women resident in Britain for the defence of their interests, in united struggle with the British working class movement, and in particular –

(a) To win support for the struggle of the Irish people for a united independent Republic, and to fight for the removal of all obstacles placed in their way by British imperialism…[7]

Unlike the militarist road of the IRA, the CA promoted obtaining these aims and objects via the following tactics:

(a) Winning majority support for them in the organised working class and democratic movement in Britain.

(b) Working for the unity and strength of the Labour movement, especially the unity of British and Irish workers…

(f) Co-operating with other organisations in matters of common concern and affiliating to or accepting affiliation from appropriate bodies as may be decided.[8]

Although individual CA (and CPGB) members had links to the IRA, particularly through the Wolfe Tone Society,[9] the only two organisations that the CA affiliated with were two organisations that the CPGB had links to, the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) and the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF).[10]

National Liberation or Peaceful Devolution?

In the era of decolonisation that followed the Second World War, the CPGB believed that the Irish Free State would gain full independence similar to India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (which did occur in 1949), but also accepted the idea that British rule in Northern Ireland was a form of neo-colonialism to be challenged by the Northern Irish population (especially the labour movement). In 1958, Greaves described the partition of Ireland as ‘a political arrangement designed to create and perpetuate precisely what has happened – to facilitate the expropriation of Irish capitalists by British financers, instead of by Irish workers’.[11] In the same year, John Hostettler suggested that Northern Ireland existed in the liminal space between a colony and part of the United Kingdom, with practices by the British having ‘the same pattern in the colonies’, but also ‘so near home’ that government and policing practices could be transferred to British sphere.[12]

The CPGB, as the Communist Party at the metropole of the largest empire at that time, were dedicated to anti-colonialism and fostering links with anti-colonial movements across the Empire. Unlike its support for the insurgent national liberation movements that emerged in the British colonies, such as in Malaya, Kenya and Nigeria, the CPGB chose to support the united Irish labour movement (including the Irish Workers League), rather than the more militarised republican movement embodied by Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army. In the post-war era, the CPGB leadership under Harry Pollitt resolved that armed insurrection, akin to what occurred in October 1917, was a foolish adventure for Western Communist Parties, and endorsed a parliamentary road to socialism, based on capturing the trade unions and building an alliance between Labour and the Communist Party. Despite the military presence of the British in Northern Ireland, the CPGB viewed the socio-political conditions of Ireland as similar to Britain and believed that focusing on developing the strength of the labour movement to gain political power, rather than armed rebellion, which was happening elsewhere in the British Empire. In 1947, the CPGB hosted a conference that brought Communist and Workers’ Parties from across the British Empire to London. At this conference, a representative from the IWL pronounced:

Our policy is aimed to bring about a strong united labour movement which, in alliance with the working farmers and progressive forces, will provide the country with a Government which can direct it along the path of advance to socialism.[13]

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The Party called for the remaining British troops stationed in the North to be removed, but believed that this could done peacefully. In some instances, the situation in Northern Ireland was seen as more akin to the political landscape in Scotland or Wales, thus requiring a strategy of progressive devolution-cum-independence, rather than the strategy of insurgent national liberation needed in many other colonies. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Communist Party advocated for devolution in Scotland and Wales, with their own parliaments, but keeping within the United Kingdom, but saw Northern Ireland as a superficial entity that needed to be reunited with the Republic of Ireland. For example, in the 1958 version of The British Road to Socialism, the Party stated:

The withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland is necessary to end the enforced partition of Ireland, and leave the Irish people free to establish their united Republic.[14]

Speaking on the national question in Marxism Today in 1968, leading Welsh Party member Idris Cox wrote ‘Northern Ireland would have no part as such in a British federal system’ as envisaged by the CPGB at that time.[15] However Greaves, with his focus on Ireland, was one of the few in the late 1960s in favour of full self-determination for Scotland and Wales, as well as the break-up of the United Kingdom.[16]

Relationship with militant Republicans and NICRA

Supporting the push for civil rights for the Catholic population in Northern Ireland, as well as an end to the ‘police state’ present in the North, the Party was sympathetic to the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), which included people from the Communist Party of Northern Ireland and the Wolfe Tone Society. After a series of civil rights marches were attacked by the police and Loyalist gangs in August 1968, Labour Monthly (edited by long-time CPGB figure R. Palme Dutt) published an account of these attacks by NICRA and CPNI member Betty Sinclair.[17]

The relationship with Sinn Fein and the IRA, despite some links between them, the Wolfe Tone Society and the Connolly Association, was much more fractious for most of the 1960s. In a bulletin published by the CPGB’s International Department in 1968, the Party wrote that Sinn Fein’s United Irishman newspaper ‘increasingly reflects the interests of petit-bourgeoisie and small independent capitalists’, but welcomed the leftwards turn that Sinn Fein had taken in the mid-1960s.[18] Even the Connolly Association asserted in July 1966 that it favoured ‘the political strength of the working class movement’ to the ‘power of the gun’ proposed by Seamus Costello,[19] at that time a leading figure in the IRA.

an-phoblacht-no-8-nov-dec-1966Despite taking a leftwards turn, some within the militant Republican movement were highly critical of the criticisms made by the Connolly Association, with the Cork based Irish Revolutionary Fighters, describing the Association’s position on the armed struggle as ‘reactionary politics’[20] and writing in 1966:

We would suggest that the protégés of the Connolly Association… return to the orbit of the British Communist Party, and keep their cotton-picking-fingers [sic] out of our business.[21]

It also had harsh words for the CPGB, doubting its revolutionary character and describing it as ‘nothing more than the “servant boy” of British imperial interests’.[22]

The outbreak of the conflict in 1968 and the arrival of British troops in Derry in 1969 changed the outlook of the British left towards what was happening in Northern Ireland and the wider ‘Irish Question’. The CPGB continued to call for mass movement to fight for civil rights in the north and against the British presence in the statelet, while some Trotskyist groups, such as the International Marxist Group and the International Socialists, ‘critically’ supported the Provisional IRA after the split within the Irish Republican movement in 1969-70. Like many other social movements that the CPGB was involved in, the Party had been at the forefront of building solidarity between the British and Irish labour movements for the purpose of a reunited Ireland, but was slowly overtaken by more radical groups in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s.

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[1] V.I. Lenin, ‘The Right of Nations to Self-Determination’, Marxists Internet Archive, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch08.htm (accessed 6 January, 2015).

[2] Letter of Anglo-American Secretariat to Ireland RE: elections (7 January, 1932), Comintern Archives, RGASPI 495/89/75/1. As cited in, David Convery, ‘Internationalism or Paternalism? Relations Between British and Irish Communists, 1920-1941’ (forthcoming).

[3] See: Richard English, ‘Socialism and Republican Schism in Ireland: The Emergence of the Republican Congress in 1934’, Irish Historical Studies, 27/105 (May 1990) pp. 48-65. As cited in Convery, ‘Internationalism or Paternalism?’

[4] Jim Shields, ‘The Republican Congress and Ireland’s Fight’, Labour Monthly (November 1934) p. 687.

[5] David Convery, ‘Revolutionary Internationalists: Irish Emigrants in the Spanish Civil War’, in Mícheál Ó hAodha & Máirtín Ó Catháin, New Perspectives on the Irish Abroad: The Silent People? (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books 2014) pp. 131-144.

[6] Kevin Morgan, Gidon Cohen & Andrew Flinn, Communists and British Society 1920-1991 (London: Rivers Oram Press, 2007) p. 201.

[7] Connolly Association, What is the Connolly Association? Constitution and Explanation (Derby: Connolly Association, 1963) p. 1.

[8] Connolly Association, What is the Connolly Association?, p. 2.

[9] Kenneth Sheehy, ‘In the Shadow of Gunmen: The Wolfe Tone Society, 1963-1969’, unpublished paper, https://www.academia.edu/8441579/In_the_Shadow_of_Gunmen_The_Wolfe_Tone_Society_1963-1969 (accessed 30 November, 2016).

[10] Connolly Association, What is the Connolly Association?, p. 14.

The CPGB had close relationships with both the NCCL and the MCF, with some Party members holding leadership positions in both organisations. See: Christopher Moores, ‘From Civil Liberties to Human Rights? British Civil Liberties Activism and Universal Human Rights’, Contemporary European History, 21/2 (May 2012) pp. 179-181; Josiah Brownell, ‘The Taint of Communism: The Movement for Colonial Freedom, the Labour Party, and the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1954-70’, Canadian Journal of History, Autumn 2007, pp. 235-258.

[11] C. Desmond Greaves, ‘What of Northern Ireland?’, World News (12 July, 1958) p. 438.

[12] John Hostettler, ‘Northern Ireland’, Marxism Today (November 1958) p. 332.

[13] W. McCullough, ‘Ireland’, in CPGB, We Speak for Freedom (London: CPGB pamphlet, 1947) p. 60.

[14] CPGB, The British Road to Socialism (London: CPGB pamphlet, 1958) p. 24.

[15] Idris Cox, ‘The National Problem in Britain’, Marxism Today (June 1968) p. 191.

[16] Desmond Greaves, ‘The National Problem in Britain’, Marxism Today (October 1968) p. 312.

[17] Betty Sinclair, ‘Aftermath of Derry’, Labour Monthly (December 1968) pp. 555-559.

[18] CPGB International Department, International Affairs Bulletin: Ireland, 3/1 (May/June 1968) p. 8.

[19] ‘Force or Agreement?’, Irish Democrat (July 1966) p. 3.

[20] Paddy Mac, ‘The Neo-Parnellites: Irish Democrat Flies True Colours’, An Phoblacht, 7 (September 1966) p. 11.

[21] ‘The Yahoos and An Phoblacht’, An Phoblacht, 8 (November/December 1966) p. 7.

[22] ‘Wolfe Tone Society Exposed’, An Phoblacht, 9 (January 1967) p. 8.

Paperback edition of ‘Against the Grain: The British Far Left from 1956’ is out now

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This is a quick announcement that the paperback version of Against the Grain: The British Far Left from 1956 (edited by myself and Matthew Worley) is now available. If you haven’t ordered a copy yet, you really should do so. If you are in the UK, I would recommend buying via here (or asking Bookmarks, Housmans or News From Nowhere for it). Or if you are in Australia, please buy from here. And wherever you are in the world, do support your local independent book stores and ask whether they can order it in for you.

I am pleased to announce that the second volume, Waiting for the Revolution: The British Far left from 1956 vol. II, will be published by Manchester University Press, probably late in 2017.

 

Forthcoming volume: The Far Left in Australia since 1945

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I am happy to announce that Jon Piccini, Matthew Worley and I have recently signed a contact for an edited volume tentatively titled The Far Left in Australia since 1945 as part of Routledge’s Studies in Radical History and Politics. While there is no publication date yet, here is an outline of the forthcoming book as a preview…

The far left in Australia – as has been revealed by edited collections on its equivalents in the UK, USA and elsewhere – had significant effects on post-war politics, culture and society. The Communist Party of Australia (CPA) ended World War II with some 20,000 members, and despite the harsh and vitriolic Cold War climate of the 1950s, seeded or provided impetus for the re-emergence of other movements. Radicals subscribing to ideologies beyond the Soviet orbit – Maoists, Trotskyists, anarchists and others – also created parties and organisations and led movements. All of these different far left parties and movements changed and shifted during time, responding to one political crisis or another, but they remained steadfastly devoted to a better world.

Equally, members and fellow travellers of the CPA and other far left groups instigated or became centrally involved in struggles for indigenous rights, gender equality, ending immigration restrictions, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and fostering peace—alongside continuing work in trade unions. In starting these groups, providing personnel, funding and guidance, far left activists contributed in no small way to the reforms that have changed Australian from the racist, sexist and parochial society of 1945 to one which is now multicultural, champions gender equality and is open to the world. The far left’s contribution to culture also cannot be ignored, with the CPA in particular providing a home for writers, poets, film makers and others who found their experimentation unwelcomed in an Australia in the grips of the cultural cringe.

Lastly, the Australian far left has also had a fascinating – if troubled and convoluted – career of ‘mainstreaming’ itself, whether through aforementioned cultural organisations, or through working with the social democratic Australian Labor Party, forming their own electoral alliances, or reaching out with mass market books. As such, while the far left might have never led a revolution in Australia, it has inarguably played a central role in revolutionising it.

The study of protest movements is exploding around the world. Major research and publishing projects charting the far left – particularly set around that halcyon year of 1968 – have appeared in most western nations in recent years. Yet, no such comparable body of work exists for Australia’s vibrant and exciting far left movements in the post-war era – from the Communist Party of Australia to smaller ideological groups, their intersections with broader movements for women’s, indigenous and gay liberation and broader effects on culture and society. By analysing far left movements in Australia from 1945 to the 1980s, these interconnections are explored in depth, and a light can be shone on the current state of Australia’s left and progressive movements.

As such, this book’s key strengths lie in its broad range of topics – from the politics of Australian communism in its various forms to the far left’s interactions with the women’s, gay, anti-nuclear, anti-war and indigenous groups, as well as attempts to mainstream its appeal via electoral politics, government compromises and mass media.

This work exists at the intersection of academia and activism, offering politically and theoretically informed chapters which provide both valuable scholarly interventions into key local and global debates, as well as casting light on contemporary struggles around the world. As such, its readership will be broad, encompassing activists of all ages and across a variety of causes, as well as the growing body of academics and postgraduate students studying and teaching global radicalism, as well as scholars engaged in 20th century history in general.

This collection, bringing together 14 chapters from leading and emerging figures in the Australian and international historical profession, for the first time charts some of these significant moments and interventions, revealing the Australian far left’s often forgotten contribution to the nation’s history.

Stay tuned to this blog for further information about the volume in the near future!

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No Platform documentary on BBC Radio 4 (featuring me!)

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Last month I was interviewed about the history of the NUS policy of ‘no platform’ by BBC Radio 4 for a documentary on the subject, hosted by Professor Andrew Hussey from SOAS. It aired on Saturday night in the UK and is now available to listen to on the BBC iplayer. You can find the programme here.

Orgreave is not merely history, but an important historical incident that needs to be fully investigated

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To Guardian journalist Simon Jenkins, just over thirty years ago is too far into the past for an inquiry into the events at Orgreave in June 1984, when the police reacted violently to striking workers in South Yorkshire and led to the arrest of 95 miners, as well as a number of people injured. Jenkins argues that “we know” what happened at Orgreave on that day, and that it should be left in the past – even though no one in a position of authority has been held accountable for excessive force used by the police against the striking miners. Anyway ‘[t]here were no deaths at Orgreave’, he says, so an inquiry, like those held into Bloody Sunday or Hillsborough, is unnecessary. But this assumes that the only reason to have an inquiry into police actions is when there is a death involved – isn’t the likelihood of excessive force being used by the police en masse enough of an issue to warrant further investigation?

Jenkins is right in that government inquiries often don’t led to any significant reform or ‘lessons learned’. Even the stand out inquiries of Lord Scarman into the Brixton Riots of 1981 and the 1999 Macpherson Inquiry into the Investigation into the Death of Stephen Lawrence have been criticised for their limited impact upon the policing of ethnic minority communities in the UK (especially in the wake of the 2011 riots). But most inquiries held are short term affairs, announced by the government of the day to placate public opinion and often to appear to be ‘doing something’. A swathe of criminological and public policy scholarship has proposed that public inquiries are foremost exercises in the management of public opinion, rather than missions to find the ‘truth’ behind an incident or to determine accountability. Between the Scarman Inquiry into the Events at Red Lion Square in 1974 and the Macpherson Inquiry in 1998-99, there have been numerous inquiries into the actions of the police (and other government agencies) that have resulted in disorder, injuries and even death. Besides the Scarman Report in 1981 and the Macpherson Report almost 20 years later, most inquiries have left little mark on police practice. There are a number of incidents involving the death of people involved in interactions with the police, such as that of Blair Peach in 1979 and Ian Tomlinson in 2009, where there has been a coronial inquest, but no wider inquiry, even though people have demanded it.

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But an inquiry into Orgreave is likely to be much more far-reaching than those held immediately after the fact, similar to the Saville Inquiry into Bloody Sunday or the Hillsborough Independent Panel. These inquiries were held after the initial inquiries, the Widgery Report into Bloody Sunday in 1972 and Taylor Report into Hillsborough in 1989-90, were seen to be deficient by subsequent governments. Both of these inquiries were held over years, rather than weeks or months, and had legislation specifically introduced to open many documents that had previously been classified. In the end, these inquiries identified those who should be (or should have been) held accountable for these tragic events and delivered some form of justice to the relatives of the victims. Jenkins suggests that these were merely costly exercises in legal navel-gazing and that the cost of both inquiries could have been better spent on been given to the relatives of the victims and/or to their communities. However what had driven those pushing for the events at both Bloody Sunday and Hillsborough to be re-examined was not compensation, but for those responsible to identified and where possible, held accountable in some way.

This is the purpose of a proposed inquiry into the events at Orgreave on 18 June 1984. Opposite to Jenkins’ argument, we don’t know the full story of what happened on that day. We have footage, we have witness testimony and the paperwork of those who were dragged through the courts, but we don’t have the police side of the story (or at least the full story). Despite thirty years since the event passing, no documents relating to Orgreave have been made open by the National Archives at Kew and the police have refused several previous FOI requests. Like the documents examined by the Hillsborough Independent Panel, all police and government papers relating to the events at Orgreave should be released to an inquiry and at the completion of said inquiry, these documents (with the necessary redactions) should be digitised and made available for public viewing.

Jenkins says there should be a statute of limitations on inquiries into the past, writing ‘History is for historians’. He seems to be proposing that there is a clear line between contemporary politics and ‘the past’, but it is not so clear-cut. Thirty years ago is not that long ago and there are still people who were involved in police actions on that day in 1984 who could be held accountable in some manner. There are still people affected the actions of the police who are looking for some kind of ‘justice’ and official acknowledgment of what occurred, particularly how much was planned and how far the authorities went in the aftermath to absolve themselves of any blame.

Jenkins equates a possible inquiry with Tony Blair’s apologies for the slave trade and the Irish Famine, but this is false. The ‘Battle of Orgreave’ happened within the lifetimes for many of us, not 150-200 years ago. Orgreave is not merely history, but an important historical incident that needs to be fully investigated. Let’s hope that enough pressure is put upon Amber Rudd (or her successor) to reverse the decision for an inquiry not to be held.

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Photos by John Sturrock, originally from Socialist Worker.

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South African progressives and the Suez Crisis of 1956

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On 29 October, 1956, the Suez Crisis began with an Israeli attack upon Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, with the UK and France intervening the subsequent days to ‘protect’ the Suez Canal. Many historians have viewed these actions as the last major ‘roll of the dice’ for the British and French governments hoping to stem the decolonisation process in Africa and the Middle East, and the drawing of the postcolonial world into closer ties with the Soviet Bloc.

From South Africa, progressives watched as imperialist forces invaded one of its former colonies to prevent a programme of nationalisation, occurring amidst the wider decolonisation process across Africa, Asia and the Middle East. This worried the various progressive groups that still existed in South Africa in the mid-1950s. Eight years into Apartheid rule, the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) had been banned in 1950 and its membership driven underground (its successor, the South African Communist Party (SACP), was not officially established until 1960). The African National Congress (ANC) was still a legal organisation, but a month later, most of its leadership would be arrested and put on trial for treason by the Strijdom government. The remnants of the CPSA that remained in South Africa were often also members of the ANC, while other former CPSA activists coalesced around organisations, such as the ex-servicemen group, the Springbok Legion.

The Suez Crisis, coming at the same time as the Soviet invasion of Hungary, shocked these progressives as a blatant imperialist reaction to the decolonisation process, and an affront to the sovereignty of these newly formed postcolonial nations. In their journal Liberation, the ANC called the action a ‘blatant aggression’ and stated:

British, French and Israeli troops have invaded Egypt and occupied Egyptian territory by force of arms; a wanton, premeditated act of aggression taken in defiance of solemn undertakings under the United Nations Charter.

The reason for this invasion, the ANC declared, was control of the Suez Canal and the revenue generated from this, with the Israeli invasion providing a pretext for seizing control. The journal continued:

[T]hat in fact is exactly what the English and French imperialists are out for – loot. They want to grab the Suez Canal. The Israeli attack was just a feeble excuse (no doubt it was fixed up in advance with the Israeli Government)…

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Meanwhile, the newspaper New Age, run by a number of ex-CPSA members, such as Ruth First, published on its front page a statement drawn up by several progressive organisations in South Africa, such as the ANC, the Indian National Congress, the Coloured People’s Association and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). The statement read:

The invasion by the Israeli army and the decision of the British and French Governments to re-occupy the Suez Canal zone constitute a serious act of aggression against Egypt which will have world-wide repercussions…

These acts are in total disregard of the territorial sovereignty of the Egyptian people and cannot be justified by any alleged provocations. Britain and France have used Israel as a spearhead to re-establish themselves as masters of the Suez Canal in order to maintain their domination over colonial countries in Africa and the Middle East.

This idea of Britain and France reasserting their imperial dominance over the postcolonial world was something that was also highlighted by the ANC. As well retaking the Suez Canal, the ANC suggested that the Anglo-French aims were ‘to overthrow the Nasser Government and re-occupy Egypt as a colony’ in the short term, and ‘to teach the peoples of the colonies and former colonies of Africa, Asia and the Middle East “a lesson”’ in the long term. At this time, the British were fighting anti-colonial movements in Malaya, Cyprus and Kenya, while the French were fighting the National Liberation Front in Algeria.

However the actions of the British and French were not successful and both countries were chastised by the United Nations. Both the ANC and those attached to the New Age newspaper celebrated the fact that Egypt had not been defeated by the imperialist forces. Two weeks after the fighting stopped, the New Age newspaper wrote:

The force of world anger at the British, French and Israeli invasion of Egypt has led to a cease-fire and brought to a temporary halt the use of naked aggression to crush the Nasser government. This is a victory for the forces of progress, but it is by no means a final victory.

The ANC were just as celebratory, writing:

The plot to conquer Egypt has failed; the “lesson” has turned out to be the greatest fiasco in modern history. As we write, the aggressors’ armies are still in Egypt, but we cannot doubt that the massive reaction of the peace-loving people of the whole world will compel them to withdraw unconditionally, and to compensate the innocent Egyptian people for the damage and suffering that they have caused.

From this, both publications expressed solidarity between the progressive and anti-imperialist forces in South Africa and the Egyptian people as allies in the fight against imperialism and racialism. The ANC declared that the Suez Crisis had inspired ‘the awakening millions of Britain’s African empire’ and ‘[i[nstead of frightening the colonial world’, the Anglo-French-Israeli attack had:

raised against themselves a storm of mass solidarity, indignation and determination that can only hasten the doom of imperialism and colonialism through-out the world.

The aforementioned statement on the front page of the New Age finished with this expression of solidarity:

On behalf of all peace-loving South Africans we demand an end to force and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egyptian territory. We express our sympathy with the Egyptian people and our support for their just claim to sovereignty in the own country.

In an editorial contained in the same issue, the links between progressives in South Africa and the Nasser government in Egypt were reiterated:

As an African country we are closely involved in this invasion of Africa. As members of the liberation movement we are closely involved in this attack on a liberation movement. As opponents of national oppression and colonialism we are involved in this oppressive and imperialist war…

We dare not remain quiet. Our voices must be heard in the call for an end to the war in Egypt – in the demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of that country.

But while these various groups expressed solidarity in the face of imperialist attack, they did not all consider Colonel Nasser in the same light. Moses Kotane, the General Secretary of the CPSA and then the SACP, stated in New Age that Nasser was ‘no fascist’ as the Western media and politicians had described him, but was ‘an ardent nationalist whose main concern is the freedom, independence, progress and honour of Egypt and her 25 million inhabitants’. Kotane explained that Nasser played an important role in the worldwide anti-colonial movement, saying, ‘Colonel Nasser desires to see colonialism ended in Africa, Asia and the rest of the world.’ He concluded his outline of Nasser with this:

The South African people must clearly understand that the continued independence and progress of the Egyptian people means a lot to their own struggle against apartheid and injustices in this country.

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Lionel Bernstein, a comrade of Kotane in the CPSA/SACP and editor of the Springbok Legion’s Fighting Talk, was much more critical of Nasser and his government. The revolution that was led by Nasser and his fellow army generals was, according to Bernstein, simply passing Egypt ‘into the hands of the new dictatorship of the military junta, acting without consultation with the people, without elections, without any authority save the force they commanded’. Bernstein pointed to locking up of all political opponents, including Egypt’s communists, as a very negative aspect of the regime, but also pointed to positive changes, such as the creation of a ‘democratic’ constitution. However this constitution was deemed to be a constitution of the bourgeoisie – ‘the creation of the Nasser regime, of the middle-class revolutionaries representing the middle class of Egypt’. Teleologically it was moving the country ‘steadily away from military dictatorship towards bourgeois democracy’, but for Bernstein, the Nasser regime was not socialist.

On the other hand, Bernstein recognised Egypt’s commitment to anti-colonial solidarity:

It is a government of fighters against foreign subjection, taking the first steps against colonialism, against the backward heritage of imperialism. Let its enemies look to their own record in their own territory – in Kenya and Algeria, in Cyprus and in Malaya and Morocco and compare the record.

The Suez Crisis coincided with the Soviet invasion of Hungary and this led to a schism amongst communists, socialists and other progressives across the globe. Unlike other Communist Parties in the West, the fact that the CPSA had disbanded and gone underground meant similar open debates that occurred in the British, French and Italian parties could not happen, and in general, amongst South African progressives, the events in Hungary were seen as justified in comparison with the Anglo-French-Israeli actions in Egypt. In the New Age, it was pronounced that comparison between the two interventions was a ‘false analogy’, stating:

  • The Anglo-French aggression was directed against the Egyptian government; the Soviet [gave] assistance on the invitation of the Hungarian government.
  • The Anglo-French forces invaded Egypt. The Soviet forces were stationed in Hungary with the recognised responsibility of protecting Hungary’s independence and preventing her return to fascism.
  • Britain and France had no shred of legal right to invade; the Soviet armed forces were legally in Hungary in terms of the Warsaw pact.
  • Most important of all – the issue of Egypt is between imperialism and national liberation; the issue in Hungary is between socialism and reaction…

In the editorial of Liberation, the ANC made a similar case for the differences between Suez and Hungary:

we should not forget that the Soviet Union has not suddenly ‘invaded’ Hungary, as the British and French have invaded Egypt. Soviet troops have been in Hungary ever since the end of the second world war, and as a result of that war.

From these statements, it is evident that the progressive forces in South Africa were particularly concerned about other national liberation movements in Africa (and across the rest of the world) in their fight against imperialism and colonialism. Experiencing a severe racialist reaction against the decolonisation process in the form of Apartheid, South African progressives expressed solidarity with the Egyptian people and viewed the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion as part of a wider reaction by the global West against decolonisation. In the following years, southern Africa would be viewed as anomaly where the imperialist powers had not relinquished their stranglehold on these settler colonies, in the face of a generally decolonised African continent.

On the other hand, those progressives that were part of the SACP and ANC looked to the Soviet Union, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement (which had first met the previous year in Bandung) as guiding forces in the anti-colonial struggle. The ANC called the USSR ‘a great power openly and irrevocably hostile to imperialism’ that had ‘enabled the former colonies triumphantly to proclaim and consolidate their independence’. Criticism of the Soviets would come later on, but in 1956, there was little dissent amongst what the ANC and the underground SACP expressed towards the Soviet Union.

Like the putting down of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, the Suez Crisis showed South African progressives that the British were unwilling to give up control of some colonies that had strategic value to them, or where they felt that communists could potentially take power. Although Harold Macmillan would speak of ‘winds of change’ across Africa a few years later, the long struggle against Apartheid and imperialism in southern Africa was only just beginning.

 

 

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Age disputes and the non-medical use of x-rays in the UK border control system

Tory backbencher David Davies has recently called for dental x-rays to verify the ages of refugees coming from Calais. Although these calls were dismissed by the Home Office and the British Dental Association, this is an issue that has lingered since the 1970s. Below is a post based on an article that Marinella Marmo and I wrote back in 2013, with a lot more historical data included. This case study also features in our book Race, Gender and the Body in British Immigration Control (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

border-control

The motive of suspicion

In the UK border control system, there is a high level of suspicion inherent, with border control practices often starting from the assumption that migrants, visitors and those seeking asylum are attempting to evade or deceive the system. The default thinking of the border control system seems to assume that certain migrant groups are not who they say they are when interacting with the system. As Marmo and Smith (2010a; 2010b) have argued, there has been a long-standing belief in the UK border control system that migrants and asylum seekers, particularly from Asia and Africa, are potentially ‘bogus’ migrants, with constant mention by the authorities about the unreliability of the testimony of migrants and asylum seekers from these parts of the world, as well as a suspicion that documentary evidence provided by these migrants is likely to be fake. The authorities claim to weigh up decisions ‘on balance of probabilities’, but it is often the case that the border control staff begin from a point of total disbelief and shift the burden of proof onto the person applying to enter the country. With this burden of proof placed upon the individual, it is often difficult to persuade the authorities that their reasons to enter the country, as a visitor, a working migrant, a migrating family member or even as a refugee, is genuine, which is made more difficult by the presumption that testimony and documentary evidence provided by certain migrant groups is likely to be falsified. Under the intense scrutiny of the border control authorities, if testimony and documents are not considered to be convincing enough, the focus of the authorities may shift to physical examination, with the body becoming the marker of ‘truth’. As Didier Fassin and Estelle d’Hallunin (2005: 598) wrote about refugees in the French border control system, ‘their word is systematically doubted [and] it is their bodies that are questioned’.

This post examines one particular way in which the body is questioned by the border control system – the use of x-rays for age assessment. The use of x-rays for this purpose is a non-medical use of the technology and is used solely for the administration of the border control system in an attempt to determine whether a person intercepted by the system is telling ‘the truth’ or not. This post will look at how x-rays were used in the UK border control system in the past and the continued debate about whether to reintroduce the practice for border control purposes, particular the decision by the UK Border Agency (UKBA) to trial the use of dental x-rays for age assessment in 2012. Within the UK border control system, the authorities have relied on the use of x-rays in an attempt to extract ‘the truth’ from people whose testimony and documentary evidence is not believed, despite the ethical concerns raised in using medical technology for non-medical purposes and criticisms that x-rays are not satisfactory tools for assessing age.

The use of x-rays in the 1970s

In the UK context, x-rays were used in controlling immigration from South Asia during the 1960s and 1970s. By this time, the largest number of migrants entering the UK was from the Indian subcontinent in the form of family reconciliation. Many young men came to the UK from South Asia in the 1950s and early 1960s before the introduction of immigration controls and with a decline in labour migration from this region in the early 1970s, the majority of migrants from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were the families of the young men who had arrived in the UK in the decades before. Several pieces of legislation had been introduced between 1962 and 1971 to limit mass migration from the British Commonwealth, but the Immigration Act 1971 still allowed the wives and children (under the age of 18) to join their family members already residing in the UK. With the significant number of migrants applying to enter UK under the guise of family reconciliation, particularly as children aged under 18, the UK authorities thought that this was a loophole that could be exploited, often as documentation regarding children was less substantial than an adult (for example, children often did not have their own passports and were simply listed on an adult’s passport). The UK border control staff were especially concerned about teenage male migrants, who, if they were over the age of 18, would not be allowed to enter the UK and who were the least ‘desirable’ (due to their labour capacity) in 1970s Britain. To determine whether teenagers were falsely claiming to be under 18 for migration purposes, the UK border control system, particularly at the British High Commissions in South Asia where applications for entry clearance certificates were first assessed, used x-rays of the wrists of individuals to estimate the skeletal age of the applicant.

Although the practice had occurred for most of the 1970s, it was not until The Guardian published details of gynaecological examinations being conducted on migrating South Asian women in early 1979 that the practice became widely known. At the height of the ‘virginity testing’ controversy in February 1979 (see Smith and Marmo 2011), details also emerged that x-rays were being taken of women and children to ascertain the age of suspected ‘bogus’ migrants, as well as for supposed communicable diseases. It was claimed in The Guardian that these x-rays were being conducted by unqualified immigration officers at Heathrow, as well as at High Commissions abroad, which ‘expose[d] both the passengers and clerks to considerable radiation hazards’ (The Guardian, 9 Feb, 1979: 1). The Guardian (8 Feb, 1979: 1) also reported that at the British High Commission in Dacca, a pregnant woman had her skull x-rayed, ‘despite the fact that Department of Health regulations would prevent such a test on pregnant British women’. A possible indication that the British Government held strict immigration control as a primary concern, rather than providing humanitarian approach to potential migrants, was in the response to these allegations by Eric Deakins, a junior Department of Health Minister, who said that ‘immigration screening cannot be measured against [domestic] NHS standards’ (The Guardian, 9 Feb, 1979: 1). Like the virginity ‘tests’, the veracity and usefulness of these examinations was questioned, with Labour MP Jo Richardson stating, ‘medical opinion… is beginning to query the practice. It is beginning to say that it is an unreliable method of determining age’ (House of Commons, Hansard, 19 Feb, 1979: 216). In response to the questions surrounding the use of x-rays in immigration control, the Labour Government acquiesced somewhat in the face of mounting criticism and Rees announced the Chief Medical Officer, Sir Henry Yellowlees would ‘carry out a review of the objects and nature of all medical examinations in the immigration control context’ (Cited in, Juss 1997: 109).

However there were many who felt that an internal investigation to be conducted by Yellowlees seemed to be an attempt to stem further discussion of the subject and to deflect further criticism of the Government in the lead up to the 1979 General Election. Various critics, from Jo Richardson in Parliament and from the editorial pages of The Guardian in particular, condemned the lack of transparency in the Government’s immigration control procedures. Ms Richardson declared in Parliament, that it was ‘high time that the secret instructions given by the Home Secretary to immigration officers under the immigration legislation were made public’ (House of Commons, Hansard, 19 Feb, 1979: 217). The treatment of legitimate migrants and the scrutiny placed upon one’s application to enter Britain was heavily determined by the discretion of individual Entry Clearance Officers, but the manner in which these discretionary powers manifested were open to any kind of evaluation by anyone outside the border control system. An editorial in The Guardian (10 Feb, 1979: 8) criticised the extent of the discretionary powers of ECOs and the lack of transparency in the application of such powers:

The central issue thrown up by the variety of medical tests remains that of discretion and its monitoring… When the virginity tests first came to light, we said that investigation of a particular case was not enough and that a full debate on immigration procedures was needed… But it cannot begin until the full codes of guidance for immigration officers and their medical colleagues as well, are published and the scope of their practices is clearly and publicly disclosed.

This frustration with the internal inquiry being conducted by Henry Yellowlees led to the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) to propose an independent investigation into discrimination within immigration control, which lasted from 1981 to 1985. The inquiry performed by Yellowlees and his assistant, Dr N.J.B. Evans, on the other hand, was undertaken during 1979-1980, with the final report released to Parliament in April 1980.

Evans travelled to South Asia in 1980 to investigate the broad topic of medical examination within the immigration control system and with his fieldwork, much of the final report was written by him. A draft version of the Yellowlees report (1980a: appendix 1, 2) stated, according to ‘orthodox radiological opinion in the UK and overseas’, it was ‘acceptable to use such bone X-rays to assist in estimating the age of children’, while the final report concluded that x-rays were ‘a potentially more accurate method of estimating the age of children’ than other examinations of the body, such as ‘skin texture, wrinkling or firmness of tissues, and of noting indications of puberty’ (Yellowlees, 1980b: appendix 1, 1-2). Based on North American studies, the report claimed that ‘[t]he accuracy attainable is in the order of plus or minus six months and the radiation exposure negligible’ and while noting that tables of skeleton maturity were based on North American children and there is ‘very little firm data’ on how these tables compared with the skeletons of children from South Asia, the report argued that it was assumed that skeletons matured earlier in South Asian children and were thus still useful (Yellowlees, 1980b: appendix 1, 2). The major finding of the report regarding the use of x-rays for age assessment purposes was:

  1. I conclude that the use of X-rays of the bony skeleton provides a useful, fairly accurate and acceptable safe way of estimating age of children when it is important to do so. (Children in this context means up to about 21 years…) Only one or two X-ray pictures need be taken, of the upper limb or the lower limb excluding the hips. Provided proper shielding is used in accordance with normal radiological practice, the radiation dose to the parts X-rayed is minimal and the scattered gonadal dose is insignificant. These views accord with informed radiological opinion in the UK and overseas (Yellowlees, 1980b: appendix 1, 3).

The report also concluded that ‘United Kingdom radiological opinion holds that X-rays are not particularly useful for estimating the age of adults’, but acknowledged that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had instructed Entry Clearance Officers in October 1979 that x-rays should not be administered on anyone thought to be over 21 years of age (Yellowlees, 1980b: appendix 1, 3-4).

Despite the Yellowlees Report recommending that the border control system continue to use x-rays to assess the age of migrants thought to be under 21 years of age, several other people and organisations criticised this viewpoint. At the AGM of the British Medical Association in 1979, a resolution was passed that stated that ‘radiological examinations, carried out solely for administrative and political purposes, are unethical’ and proposed that the BMA ‘make the strongest possible representation to the Government to ban these practices’ (cited in, Gordon, 1983: 15). A report prepared by Edward White for Lord Avebury, a Liberal member of the House of Lords, cited the past chair of the National Council of Radiation Protection as warning against unnecessary x-rays and claiming that ‘there is no safe level of exposure’ (cited in, Gordon, 1983: 15). White also questioned accuracy of age assessment through the use of x-rays, particularly in relation to the use of generalised data on age/bone ratio based on North American children to assess South Asian children, and concluded:

After a thorough and objective examination of the practice, one must conclude that radiological examinations are a highly inaccurate method of determining chronological age (cited in, Gordon, 1983: 16).

As mentioned before, the Yellowlees Report sidestepped the issue of data on the skeletal maturity of South Asian children and recommended that further research in this area was required. The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (1981: 13) stated that the report’s findings on x-rays ‘managed to contradict itself and most accepted medical opinion regarding the reliability of such assessment’. However in FCO briefing notes for answering press questions on the report, it stated that the Home Secretary was ‘not aware that the balance of informed medical opinion is against such tests’ (FCO 1980a: 2) and the government persisted with the claim that x-rays for age assessment purposes was both useful and relatively safe (for example, FCO 1980b).

So the x-raying of children continued throughout 1980 and 1981. In January 1981, the Foreign Minister Lord Carrington stated in the House of Lords that in the last nine months of 1980, around 360 children under 21 had been x-rayed in Dacca and around another 300 in Islamabad (House of Lords, Hansard, 19 Jan, 1981: 336w). The following January, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the FCO, David Trefgarne, announced in the House of Lords that during 1981, approximately 420 children had been x-rayed Islamabad and 262 children in Dacca (House of Lords, Hansard, 28 Jan, 1982: 1114w).

However the following month, the Home Secretary Willie Whitelaw announced that the FCO would no longer be carrying out x-rays on children for these purposes. Whitelaw stated in parliament that Yellowlees had revised his opinion since the report was released in 1980 and advised the Home Secretary that x-rays were now ‘unlikely to provide more accurate evidence of age than the assessment of other physical characteristics of an individual, and therefore can add little to the general clinical examination’ (House of Commons, Hansard, 22 Feb, 1982: 279-280w). The Runnymede Trust archive at the Black Cultural Archives in London has a copy of the letter that Yellowlees wrote to Whitelaw, which concluded that ‘the usefulness of the X-ray method of estimating age must be limited in the immigration context’ (Yellowlees, 1982: 2). Yellowlees maintained that the x-rays were relatively safe, but chiefly found that using the template of the skeletal maturity of North American or European children to assess the age of South Asian children was insufficient to make an accurate assessment of age. Yellowlees (1982: 2) stated ‘the scientific foundation for this when applied – for example – Asian children must be open to doubt’. Whitelaw said that Yellowlees had ‘concluded that such X-ray examinations are of limited value and their continued use in the immigration context can no longer be justified’ (House of Commons, Hansard, 22 Feb, 1982: 279-280w). In its report, the CRE (1985: 40) argued that since the government acknowledged that x-rays were not satisfactorily reliable for estimating age, ‘it should attempt to review previous cases where such evidence was a substantial factor leading to refusal’, but this recommendation was not enacted by the government. In a document outlining the government’s response to the CRE report, held in the Runnymede Trust archive, stated that it was ‘not feasible’ to review all of these cases ‘given the immense amount of work it would involve’ (Home Office, 1985: 12).

The UKBA trial and its critiques

Since Whitelaw’s decision to end the use of x-rays for the assessment of age in migrant children, the topic has been referred to from time to time by parliamentarians. For example, in the House of Lords debate on the Asylum and Immigration Bill 1996, Lord Avebury sought to insert an amendment which would effectively ban the use of x-rays for the assessment of age, but was rebuffed by Lord David Renton who said that, ‘[i]t is difficult for the immigration officers, medical people, or anyone to say what those people’s ages really are. If the X-ray can decide the matter, we should keep an open mind on the issue’ (House of Lords, Hansard, 20 Jun, 1996: 562-563). Aynsley-Green, et. al. (2012: 102) has shown the matter was brought up again in 2006 and 2009, and most recently has been revived by the UKBA in early 2012.

In March 2012, Zilla Bowell, the Director of Asylum for the UKBA, wrote in a letter, reproduced on the website of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, to various stakeholders announcing that there would be a three month trial of using dental x-rays to determine the age of asylum applicants. The letter said that many would ‘be aware of the difficulties that arise when we are not able to establish, with any certainty, the age of an asylum applicant’ and that the UKBA were ‘keen to utilise any appropriate tool which can increase our levels of certainty (as long as it does not have a negative impact on the individual in safeguarding terms, of course)’ (Bowell, 2012a). The trial was aimed at people assessed as adults, ‘but who continue to contend that they are children’ and the UKBA argued that ‘participation in the pilot is completely voluntary’ (Bowell 2012a).

However this proposed trail received significant criticism from immigration lawyers, medical and dental professionals and the four UK children’s commissioners, who were quoted in The Guardian (30 Mar, 2012) as claiming the proposed actions were ‘a clear breach of the rights of vulnerable children and young people and may, in fact, be illegal’. While talking to some stakeholders, Damien Green, the Conservative Minister for Immigration, admitted in parliament that the UKBA had not discussed the trial with the Equality and Human Rights Commission, but had ‘sought legal advice on the legality of the trial’ (House of Commons, Hansard, 30 Apr, 2012: 1081w). A month later, Bowell sent another letter announcing that the proposed trail was being halted, after the Chief Medical officer suggested that the UKBA discuss the trial with the National Research Ethics Service (NRES). According to Bowell (2012b), the NRES ‘concluded that our proposed trail constitutes “research” and that, as such, it requires the approval of a research committee before it can proceed’. Bowell (2012b) argued that this was ‘contrary to their expectations’, explaining that the view of the UKBA was that ‘the trial did not constitute “research” and ethical approval was not therefore necessary’. The Guardian (27 Apr, 2012) called this ‘a profound embarrassment for the Home Office’ and claimed that the Home Office had refused for a month to publicly reveal whether the agency had ever sought ethical permission for the programme’. Both Bowell (2012b) and the Minister for Families, Sarah Teather, said that no x-rays had yet taken place (House of Commons, Hansard, 30 Apr, 2012: 1236w), and the UKBA were looking into whether to proceed with the trial in the future.

With the possibility of the trial still going ahead in the future, the British Medical Bulletin published an article on the various issues surrounding the assessment of age of young people in immigration control, which declared that ‘age assessment practice in the UK remains highly inconsistent’ and was therefore unreliable for border control purposes (Aynsley-Green, et. al., 2012: 23). The authors listed five main reasons for opposing the use of x-rays to assess the age of young people:

  • Firstly, the authors pointed out that x-rays of bones or teeth ‘can never indicate precisely the chronological age of the individual’ and at best could provide an estimate of skeletal/dental maturity compared to an average control subject (Aynsley-Green, al., 2012: 24). Further to this, as x-rays for age assessment were most likely to be used to establish whether a young person was over the age of 18 or not, the authors acknowledged that the most salient group affected by this practice would be young persons between the ages of around 15 to 20 years old and in the article. However, the authors stated, ‘there is no “scientific method” that can provide a precise assessment of chronological age in individuals between 15 and 20 years of age’ (Aynsley-Green, et. al., 2012: 27).
  • Secondly, the authors noted, which the Yellowlees report had sidestepped in 1981, that ‘standards of normality’ in regards to age assessment using physical characteristics are ‘simply not available for children and young people from many countries in Asia, Africa or the Middle East’, with the authors further stating that it would ‘unsatisfactory to assess their images from the standards derived from Caucasian, European or North American children’ (Aynsley-Green, al., 2012: 24).
  • Thirdly, the authors simply state ‘although superficially easy to do, radiography demands expert interpretation by experienced paediatricians, dentists or radiologists’ (Aynsley-Green, al., 2012: 24). What the authors seem to be implying with this statement is in the border control context, x-rays for age assessment might be utilised by border control staff, rather than medical professionals. This was also a concern in 1979 when the controversy over x-rays first emerged.
  • Fourthly, the authors point out that x-rays give a dose of radiation and that the non-medical use of x-rays is not safe or ethical on these grounds, stating that the x-rays are ‘driven solely by a government’s administrative convenience and is without therapeutic benefit to the individual’ (Aynsley-Green, al., 2012: 24).
  • Lastly, the authors propose that all medical procedures should only be conducted with fully informed consent of the individual, but ‘[i]n the immigration context, ensuring that full and informed consent is obtained is complicated by cultural, religious and linguistic factors, often coupled with a general lack of understanding of medical environments’ (Aynsley-Green, al., 2012: 25). Also in the border control context, if a medical procedure is to be used as evidence where the burden of proof falls on the applicant, then the applicant has no choice but to consent or else their application will probably be unsuccessful. This can no longer be considered consent.

As well as listing these concerns, the authors mentioned a number of medical and dental bodies that opposed the use of x-rays for age assessment purposes, stating that growing concern that this use of x-rays was ‘imprecise, unethical and potentially unlawful has led every relevant statutory and professional body in the UK to argue against its use’ (Aynsley-Green, et. al., 2012: 25).

Does the border control system lack institutional memory?

The fact that the UKBA has not completely shelved the idea of using x-rays for age assessment purposes shows two things. Firstly, it shows that the border control system maintains the idea of shifting the burden of proof onto the individual applicant and that physical examination is necessary as the applicant is inherently untrustworthy. Secondly, it shows that while this idea has a long history within the border control system, it also shows that the institutional memory of the system is not as far-reaching in other areas as it attempts to recycle ideas that were dismissed as unsatisfactory thirty years ago. As long as the emphasis of the border control system lies in attempting to maintain the ‘secure’ border and the idea of the border as separating the domestic British population from the threat of migrant ‘other’ is still fostered, there will be strict scrutiny placed upon those who attempt to traverse through the system. In this world, the applicant must prostrate themselves to the interrogations of the system and all available avenues are explored to satisfy the administration of a ‘firm’ border control system. Lord Renton’s quote on keeping an ‘open mind’ on the matter of using x-rays, despite the criticisms, for immigration purposes highlights this. The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants wrote in 1985:

entry clearance procedures abroad are operated on the assumption that they need to be directed towards the detection of bogus applicants even if in the process genuine applicants are refused. This licenses entry clearance officers to behave like a fraud squad, rather than as neutral officials processing applications from the wives and children of British and settled men (JCWI, 1985: 2).

This post would argue that this still seems to be the case now.

Palgrave cover

References

Aynsley-Green, A, Cole, T, Crawley, H, Lessof, N, Boag, L & Wallace, R (2012) ‘Medical, Statistical, Ethical and Human Rights Considerations in the Assessment of Age in Children and Young People Subject to Immigration Control’, British Medical Bulletin, 102 (14 May) 17-42

Bowell, Z (2012a) Letter to stakeholders ‘Age Assessment – Dental X-Rays’ (28 Mar) http://www.ilpa.org.uk/resources.php/14476/letter-from-zilla-bowell-ukba-on-plans-to-reintroduce-use-of-x-rays-for-age-assessment (accessed 19 Dec, 2012)

Bowell, Z (2012a) Letter to NASF members (27 Apr) http://www.ilpa.org.uk/resources.php/14631/zilla-bowell-ukba-letter-on-dental-x-rays-trial-suspended (accessed 19 Dec, 2012)

Commission for Racial Equality (1985) Immigration Control Procedures: Report of a Formal Investigation (CRE, London)

Fassin, D & d’Halluin, E (2005) ‘The Truth from the Body: Medical Certificates as Ultimate Evidence for Asylum Seekers’, American Anthropologist, 107(4) 597–608

FCO (1980a) ‘X-Ray Examinations’, FCO 50/679, NA

FCO (1980b) ‘Notes for Press Enquiries: Yellowlees Review’, FCO 50/679, NA

Gordon, P (1983) ‘Medicine, racism and Immigration Control’, Critical Social Policy, 3(7) 6-20

Home Office (1985) ‘Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) Report into Immigration Control Procedures: Government Comments’, RC/RF/1/01/B, Runnymede Trust archive, Black Cultural Archives, London

Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (1981) JCWI Annual Report 1980/81 (JCWI, London)

Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (1985) ‘Briefing on Immigration Control Procedures: Report of a Formal Investigation by the Commission for Racial Equality’, RC/RF/1/01/B, Runnymede Trust archive, BCA

Juss, S (1997) Discretion and Deviation in the Administration of Immigration Control (Sweet & Maxwell, London)

Marmo, M & Smith, E (2010a) ‘Racial Profiling at the British Borders: An Historical Overview of the Process of Selection and Scrutiny’, in J. Shantz (ed.) (2010) Racial Profiling and Borders: International, Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Vanderplas Publishing, Lake Mary) 35-69.

Marmo, M & Smith, E (2010b) ‘Is There a Desirable Migrant? A Reflection of Human Rights Violations at the Border: The Case of “Virginity Testing”’, Alternative Law Journal, 35/4 (December 2010) 223-226.

Smith, E & Marmo, M (2011) ‘Uncovering the “Virginity Testing” Controversy in the National Archives: The Intersectionality of Discrimination in British Immigration History’, Gender & History, 23(1) 147–65

Yellowlees, H (1980a) Draft of The Medical Examination of Immigrants: Report by the Chief Medical Officer, FCO 50/676, NA

Yellowlees, H (1980b) The Medical Examination of Immigrants: Report by the Chief Medical Officer, FCO 50/677, NA

Yellowlees, H (1982) Letter to Willie Whitelaw (14 Jan), RC/RF/1/08, Runnymede Trust archive, BCA